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Abstract: Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1994) have used Public Choice analysis to criticize market 
socialism. Peter J. Boettke (1995) and Peter T. Leeson and Boettke (2002) have argued that F. A. Hayek's Road 
to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) constituted a form of Public Choice analysis as well. Boettke and Leeson say that 
Hayek adumbrated a form of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. This essay shows that Hayek was joined by John 
Jewkes in presaging a form of the Arrow theorem. In addition, this essay expands on the analysis by Boettke and 
Leeson, elucidating the broader implications which the Arrow theorem has for democratic socialism in 
particular. Democratic socialism is demonstrated to be impossible, in the sense that it cannot successfully 
accomplish the goals of its advocates. This is because the Arrow theorem implies that democratic political 
institutions are fundamentally incompatible with socialist economics.
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In an influential paper, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1994) utilize basic Public Choice to argue 
that market socialism would be susceptible to the inefficiencies of rent-seeking because politicians cannot be 
sufficiently incentivized to promote economically efficient resource allocation. Although the target of Shleifer's 
and Vishny's criticism is market socialism, their arguments apply equally well to democratic socialism. 
But Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 170) explicitly state that while they are sympathetic to F. A. Hayek (2007 
[1944]'s arguments in The Road to Serfdom, they will not adopt them. One reason is that Hayek's work “made a 
relatively bigger impression on public opinion than on the economics profession” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 
168). Nor do Shleifer and Vishny explain in any detail what Hayek's arguments were. According to their laconic 
summary, Hayek “argued that democracy is impossible in a country where a single leader has all the power that 
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comes with controlling capital” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 170). While this is not inaccurate, it is extremely 
over-simplified. Hayek's argument was much more detailed than this and it deserves further attention. Although 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994)'s general argument is persuasive, Hayek's own contribution was undeservedly 
neglected.
Even two authors highly sympathetic to Hayek, viz. Lawson and Clark (2010: 231), concede that 
Hayek's theory was “[not] particularly detailed,” and even they can find only three specific arguments he made: 
first, that power corrupts; second, that planners must subject voters to propaganda and political controls in order 
to dupe voters into supporting the code of values guiding and underlying the planners' plan; and third, that if 
voters' preferences are not stable, then for the plan to maintain stability and consistency, it must be administered 
non-democratically. Lawson and Clark note that these latter two explanations are inconsistent: according to one, 
voters are tricked into democratically supporting the plan, and according to the other, the plan is insulated from 
democracy, kept out of the voters' hands so that their support is not even necessary. 
But Hayek's arguments are far more sophisticated than this and less inconsistent with each other than 
Lawson and Clark (2010) suggest. According to Peter J. Boettke (1995), Hayek's (2007 [1944]) demonstrated 
familiarity with several of the key claims of contemporary Public Choice. Some of Hayek's arguments were even 
advanced enough to resemble Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke and Leeson 2002, Boettke 1995: 19f.). 
The fundamental point – according to this feature of Hayek's argument – is that no single consistent, coherent 
plan can be arrived at by democratic means. The needs to dupe voters and/or to keep the plan out of their hands 
are simply corollaries of that Arrow paradox. If this is true, then Hayek's argument was more sophisticated than 
many have realized, and it deserves more attention.
Finally, all of these authors – Shleifer and Vishny, Lawson and Clark, and Boettke and Leeson – have 
completely neglect the parallel contribution of John Jewkes. The arguments of Hayek and Jewkes against 
democratic socialism are intimately related even though Hayek's work is far more well-known than Jewkes's.1 In 
the Road to Serfdom, Hayek (2007 [1944]: 51) cites an earlier edition of Jewkes's The New Ordeal by Planning 
(1968 [1948]), saying “[i]t is the best discussion known to me of a concrete instance of the phenomenon 
discussed in general terms in this book.”. Meanwhile, for his part, Jewkes described Hayek's Road to Serfdom 
(2007 [1944]) as “masterly” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: xiii) for its “analysis which has never been confuted” (Jewkes 
1968 [1948]: 182 note). Therefore, Jewkes's criticism of democratic socialism deserves notice, if for no other 
reason than the pursuit of intellectual history.2 
This paper will compare the arguments made by Shleifer-Vishny on the one hand and Hayek-Jewkes on 
the other, demonstrating their mutual compatibility. Furthermore, it will expand on the Boettke-Leeson claim 
that Hayek presaged Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Finally, this essay will explore how the Hayek-Jewkes 
Arrow-type argument affects the policy of democratic socialism. We will demonstrate that the Arrow-type 
argument poses a grave dilemma for democratic socialism. Democratic socialism must be deemed “impossible” 
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in the sense that it cannot satisfy the desires of its advocates. Because of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the 
political institution of democracy is fundamentally incompatible with the economic system of socialism.
This essay is an exercise in political theory, exploring the political-institutional reasons why democratic 
socialism or economic democracy must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims and intentions of its advocates. It 
is not an application of economic price theory, and it does not attempt to show whether socialism must fail for 
purely economic, non-political reasons. That argument has been made elsewhere, in the Austrian literature on the 
impossibility of economic calculation under socialism (Hayek 1935; Hayek 1948: 77-91, 119-208; Brutzkus 
1935; Mises 1981 [1922]: 95-194; Hoff 1981 [1938]; Leoni 2009 [1965]; Lavoie 1985a; Lavoie 1985b; Steele 
1992; de Soto 2010; Boettke 1998; Boettke 2012: 76-96, 226-240). For the sake of argument, this essay assumes 
that there is no problem of rational economic calculation under socialism. As far as is this essay is concerned, the 
Lange (1938)-Lerner-Taylor solution of market socialism might as well have successfully refuted Mises's, 
Hayek's, and Rothbard's claim that rational economic calculation is impossible under socialism. This essay takes 
no stand against Shleifer and Vishny's (1994: 166) claim that Lange (1938) did refute Hayek and Mises. What 
this essay will argue is that democratic socialism must fail, not necessarily because it is socialist, but because it 
is democratic. Even if socialism were economically feasible, it cannot be successfully institutionalized by 
democratic means and still accomplish its goals.
The essay proceeds as follows: section I summarizes Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Section II, the heart of 
this paper, explores in detail the arguments of Hayek and Jewkes. This section elaborates on Boettke's and 
Leeson's claim that Hayek presaged Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, showing that Jewkes joined Hayek in this 
accomplishment. Furthermore, this section shows how Hayek's and Jewkes's arguments are fatal to democratic 
socialism, demonstrating that socialist economics are fundamentally incompatible with democratic political 
institutions.
I. ANDREI SHLEIFER'S AND ROBERT W. VISHNY'S “THE POLITICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM” (1994)
First, we review Shleifer's and Vishny's (1994) criticisms of market socialism in order to compare them 
to Hayek's and Jewkes's arguments against democratic socialism. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 
165f.), “Under all forms of market socialism ... politicians' objectives must determine resource allocation. 
Market socialists have traditionally assumed that politicians will assume an efficient resource allocation.” 
Advocates of democratic or market socialism “all presume efficiency-maximizing politicians” (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1994: 167) and when they prescribe what a good government ought to do, they “presume that it actually 
wants to do so” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167). Their criticism is essentially an application of the familiar and 
accepted conclusions of Public Choice (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168) and it basically predicts a failure of 
political institutions to create appropriate incentives or to prevent the abuse of power. Shleifer and Vishny use 
the economic theory of rational, utility-maximizing individuals to cast doubt on the general willingness of 
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politicians – who are human – to implement market socialism the way it is supposed to be. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 166) claim that Oskar Lange (1938)'s proposal for market socialism 
successfully refuted Ludwig von Mises's argument that economic calculation is impossible under socialism. 
Therefore, Shleifer and Vishny criticize only the political feasibility of market socialism, not its theoretical 
economic validity. They would appear to agree with Robert L. Heilbroner's (2008) statement about Soviet-style 
central planning, that “[t]he crucial missing element is not so much 'information,' as Mises and Hayek argued, as 
it is the motivation to act on information.”
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny have a second argument against market socialism: that it is vulnerable to 
rent-seeking, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.). They concede that the same 
problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies would be worse under market 
socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174).3 Hence, the criticism by Shleifer and Vishny of market socialism 
is a simple – though nonetheless valuable – application of straightforward, textbook Public Choice: the political 
officials will have insufficient incentive to implement market socialism according to the specified rules, and 
rent-seeking inefficiencies will undermine the rules of the system.4
It is worth highlighting that even though Shleifer and Vishny are targeting market socialism for their 
criticism, all of these problems they point out would be even worse under democratic socialism. For market 
socialism does attempt to impose highly limiting restraints on the behavior of public officials. According to 
market socialism, officials are to obey strict Neoclassical economic rules of cost accounting, and they are to have 
as little discretion as possible. There is no room in Lange (1938)'s system for any democratic input or discretion. 
The government's officials are to determine the solutions to simultaneous differential equations by a method of 
trial-and-error, adjusting parametrized prices until quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. Lange's goal is 
for the government to discover the single optimal equilibrium set of prices and outputs. The government's 
officials could be chosen democratically if this is desired, but it makes no fundamental difference whether they 
are democratically chosen or not, because all the officials do is follow strict rules of accounting. While in fact, 
the implementation of market socialism would require public officials to exercise more discretion and 
entrepreneurial speculation than its advocates thought (Hayek 1948: 197-199),5 the fact remains that market 
socialism – in principle, at least – attempts to rigorously constrain public officials. Even so, Shleifer and Vishny 
demonstrate, it would be plagued by Public Choice problems. Meanwhile, democratic socialism does not even 
attempt to constrain the government by anything except the will of the people. But the people can will literally 
anything. There is no strict cost-accounting which the government must obey, nor are there any other strict rules 
which are imposed to unconditionally constrain the government. Therefore, Public Choice problems would be 
even more pervasive under democratic socialism than under market socialism, and everything said by Shleifer 
and Vishny against market socialism would apply perhaps doubly or triply to democratic socialism.
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III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HAYEK AND JEWKES
1. A Brief Summary
Like Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Hayek (2007 [1944]) and Jewkes (Jewkes 1968 [1948]) used economic 
analysis to criticize the political institutional logic of democratic socialism. Their argument is therefore a form of 
Public Choice (Boettke 1995 re: Hayek). But Hayek and Jewkes went beyond Shleifer's and Vishny's (correct) 
argument that political officials will misuse their power and be insufficiently incentivized, giving rise to 
economic inefficiency. According to Hayek and Jewkes, the problem is more profound: democracy is 
fundamentally incompatible with socialism on the most basic, essential level. Hayek and Jewkes argue, not that 
politicians will abuse their power or that socialism will give rise to economic inefficiency, but that democracy 
and socialism are fundamentally incompatible, and therefore, that democratic socialism is logically incoherent. It 
is not that the government officials will have the wrong priorities or that they will use their power with malicious 
intent. Their argument is not primarily that power corrupts. In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek and Jewkes 
argue that even a perfectly well-intentioned, benevolent, and altruistic government will nevertheless fail to 
accomplish the purposes of socialism because the political institutions of democracy are fundamentally 
incompatible with the economic goals of socialism. The political and economic systems simply do not match up 
in any coherent fashion.
Peter Boettke (1995) has already demonstrated several Public Choice features of Hayek's (2007 [1944]) 
argument in the Road to Serfdom, so we shall briefly recapitulate his statements: several scholars argue that 
Hayek completely ignored Public Choice (Boettke 1995: 7). But Boettke (1995: 8) replies “the book set out to 
explicate how socialist ideas change the demands on democratic institutions and how these institutions are in 
turn transformed into instruments of totalitarian rule because of their inability to meet these changing demands 
in a manner consistent with democratic principles.” Hayek's contribution was the application of specifically 
Austrian economic theory to decision-making within non-market settings (Boettke 1995: 19). Such a project 
clearly falls within the scope of Public Choice.6
Hayek first argued that the socialist rejection of competition would unintentionally empower interest 
groups and encourage special pleading for protection (Boettke 1995: 10).7 Thus, Hayek understood one of the 
central claims of modern Public Choice, the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs (Boettke 1995: 
10). Furthermore, Hayek's defense of the rule of law – that laws should be abstract and generally applicable to all 
– may be understood as a call for a legal rule which eliminates opportunities for interest groups to obtain special 
exemptions and concessions by special pleading (Boettke 1995: 10). Note that in Boettke's reading, Hayek's 
argument is very similar to Shleifer and Vishny's concerning rent-seeking.
Second, Hayek said, economic freedom and political freedom cannot be distinguished because there is 
no separate economic sector of life. Economics is the science concerning human action which chooses means in 
order to accomplish ends. Thus, economics concerns all areas of life, and economic liberties cannot be 
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disentangled from any other aspect of life (Boettke 1995: 11).
Third, Boettke says (1995: 11f.), Hayek examined the institutional incentives facing those holding 
political power under socialism. Just as market production is guided by comparative advantage, so is political 
production. Under both market and political systems, production proceeds according to opportunity cost. But a 
political system will tend to reward those who are less than morally scrupulous about the use and abuse of 
political power. Socialism fails, not because a few “bad men” accidentally find themselves in power. On the 
contrary, it is the institutional incentives of a socialist political regime answer which explain “why the worst get 
on top” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 157-170). The system of discretionary planning requires the use of authority, and 
this incentivizes those most willing to use authority with the fewest scruples. Notice here too that in Boettke's 
reading, Hayek's argument resembles that of Shleifer and Vishny and basic Public Choice.
Fourth, Hayek anticipated Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which “could be reinterpreted as an 
application of Mises's impossibility thesis to non-market decision making via democratic voting” (Boettke 1995: 
19). Just as Mises argued that a socialist planner could not economically calculate, a democratic socialist polity – 
said Hayek – could not “calculate” the will of the people. As is well known, the only solution to Arrow-type 
voting paradoxes is dictatorship. This underlies Hayek's criticism elsewhere of the political provision of public 
goods: what are the demand-revealing processes when goods are politically provided? (Boettke 1995: 20). 
Hayek did not ideologically assume market failures away, but he recognized that like the market process, the 
political process is imperfect as well – except that the political process does not engender the same incentives 
nor information as markets do to promote error detection and correction (Boettke 1995: 20). Unfortunately, at the 
time, “a naïve view of democratic governance dominated discourse . . . [t]he voting process unambiguously 
conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15), and critics could not understand Hayek's point 
(Boettke 1995: 13-18).
In summary, Boettke (1995) finds that Hayek anticipated at least three basic teachings of Public Choice: 
the logic of collective action which enables special interests to obtain privileges, the fact that political behavior 
is conditioned by the institutional constraints and incentives of the office, and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 
The fourth feature which Boettke finds in Hayek, the impossibility of distinguishing between political and 
economic freedom, is crucial although it is not clear whether this should be considered an aspect of Public 
Choice or not.8 
It should be realized that what Hayek chiefly criticized was not redistribution of income by high levels 
of taxation, but command-and-control regulation and government ownership of the means of production. 
Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) criticized the British Labour Party's policy of nationalization, and Hayek 
was inspired by the de facto nationalization-by-regulation accomplished by the National Socialist regime in 
Germany.9 Hayek was not primarily concerned with high levels of taxation and redistribution of income such as 
we might find in Sweden. As Bruce Caldwell notes (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 30f.), “[T]he existence of such states 
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[i.e. welfare states], and whatever successes they may or may not have had, does not undermine Hayek’s logical 
argument from The Road to Serfdom: a welfare state is not socialism.”10 Because taxation and subsidy do not 
entail the same degree of command-and-control as does regulation, therefore, the example of Sweden does not 
refute Hayek (pace Samuelson in Farrant and McPhail 2009: 5, 9, 11, 12). The Swedish system relied and still 
relies predominately on redistribution of income, with relatively little regulation or nationalization (Stein 1991, 
Sanandaji 2011).11 Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010: 235) note that according to their empirical verification of 
Hayek's thesis,12
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis [that economic liberty is a necessary precondition for political 
liberty] is confirmed most strongly when looking at the legal structure and property rights and 
the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are 
more closely identified with political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index 
(fiscal size of government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
Not all government interventions in the economy are equally likely to lead us along the road to serfdom. Hence, 
when I speak of “socialism,” I have a very specific meaning in mind: nationalization and central planning, or 
else command-and-control regulation so extensive that it begins to approach nationalization and central 
planning.13 This was the classical meaning of “socialism” as intended by socialists themselves. This is also what 
contemporary advocates of democratic socialism or economic democracy have in mind, although they are not 
always so explicit or lucid (see Makovi 2016a). Fundamentally, what socialism so defined means is the abolition 
or severe restriction of the price system, where explicit government commands and regulations replace the 
information and incentivize function of prices.
The remainder of this essay will expand specifically on those features of Hayek's thought which 
approached Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, showing that John Jewkes joined Hayek in these arguments as well. 
This essay will go beyond Boettke (1995) and Boettke and Leeson (2002) and demonstrate how Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem challenges the possibility of democratic socialism.
2. The Impossibility of Agreeing on a Plan
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued (2007 [1944]: 106f.),
Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular issues. 
A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan clause by clause, 
as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic plan, to deserve the name, 
must have a unitary conception. Even if a parliament could, proceeding step by step, agree on 
some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy nobody. A complex whole in which all the 
parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other cannot be achieved through a compromise 
between conflicting views. . . . Even if, by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in 
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planning every sector of economic activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating 
these separate plans into a unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole. 
In other words, democracy cannot produce the unitary economic planning which socialism demands. Democratic 
socialism would furnish only a disjointed hodge-podge of contradictory laws and regulations which have no 
unifying theme or purpose, defeating the purpose of socialism. David Schweickart, an advocate of economic 
democracy, admits the problem as well, saying (1992: 23),
Although the society is democratic, it would not be feasible to attempt a popular vote on each 
investment project. Not only does the sheer number of projects render such a procedure 
unworkable, but it would negate a major benefit of socialized investment: the conscious 
adoption of a reasonably coordinated, coherent set of investment priorities
Hayek and Schweickart seem to agree: a transitory elected government composed of disagreeing factions cannot 
produce a coherent, consistent plan. No consensus will be forthcoming where “there exists no agreed view on 
what ought to be done” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 101).
Democracy may be workable for the management and regulation of a free-market economy simply 
because the government's activities are so restricted. A “night-watchman” state has far less to do than a socialist 
state. In other words, the smaller the scope of government, the simpler the task of achieving democratic 
consensus. But socialism dramatically expands the scope of government to embrace all aspects of life 
whatsoever. Nothing approaching a consensus can be obtained when the government's scope is so expanded to 
embrace all aspects of life. Whereas markets promote diversity and pluralism, governance demands uniformity. 
The more government supplants markets, the more uniformity replaces diversity. Greater reliance on government 
means that people cannot be allowed to go their own way, but more and more people must somehow produce an 
agreement or consensus on more and more subjects. “[T]he probability that they [those attempting to achieve a 
democratic consensus] will agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such 
action extends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:103). “We may rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the state 
only so long as it is confined to spheres where agreement exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103). But in pursuing a 
socialist policy, “democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution requires more agreement 
than in fact exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103).14 The problem is that under socialism (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 104),
the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends the plan 
is to serve. The effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central planning, without 
agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to commit themselves to take a 
journey together without agreeing where they want to go: with the result that they may all have 
to make a journey which most of them do not want at all. 
Indeed, John Jewkes shows that the central economic plans of Britain's Labour and Conservative parties 
were all mutually-contradictory (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 80-96, 1978: 61-76). Everyone agreed they wanted 
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planning but nobody agreed what the plan should be. Because no consensus can ever be reached, democratic 
socialism must and did essentially devolve into interest-group-lobbying, where every faction strives to funnel 
pork to its own constituents. As John Jewkes noted, the minister of a regime of central economic planning “will 
be subject to powerful pressure groups” which will “inevitably make him the guardian of some vested interest” 
(Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 130). No coherent central plan can arise from this, according to Jewkes (1968 [1948]: 133; 
cf. ibid. 218):
an integrated scheme must inevitably be examined by those whose interests and knowledge are 
essentially local and piecemeal. The plan will be subjected to distortion through the activities of 
pressure groups.
And so (to quote a statement made in an unrelated context: “Thresher” 174) the product of democratic socialism 
will be “one big compromise, just like a bill in the Assembly that no one wants to pass but no one is willing to 
kill. The thing gets modified and diddled in committee until it's equally unacceptable to everyone.” Therefore, as 
Nicholas Capaldi and Gordon Lloyd have noted (2011: p. xxi, n. 4), “Marxists have always been rightly 
contemptuous of democratic socialism because shifting majorities literally makes even the façade of economic 
planning impossible.”
Interestingly, Michael Harrington seems to have caught a glimpse of this problem, saying (1978: 443),
[D]ebates over priorities . . . would be resolved by a democratic process in which parties would 
compete with one another over conflicting programs. That, however, would not mean a mere 
extension of present-day “pluralist” theory, which ignores the way formal democratic rights, 
precious as they are, can be subverted by economic and social inequalities.
But Harrington does not explain how democratic socialism would avoid the pitfalls of democratic pluralism. He 
even admits (1978: 446), “I am positing the necessity of conflict among organizations that would interpret the 
common good in terms of the particular good of different strata of the citizenry.” After this admission, it is not 
clear what there is left of democratic socialism to salvage.
3. The Problem of Special Interest Lobbying (Rent-Seeking): Two Interpretations
In some respects, the foregoing analysis by Hayek and Jewkes is similar to that of Shleifer and Vishny, 
but there are important distinctions to be drawn. According to Shleifer and Vishny, the problem with market 
socialism is that it is vulnerable to the influence of pressure groups. Citing the standard Public Choice literature, 
they argue that under market socialism, the government will cater to well-organized minority interests rather 
than promote the public good, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.).15 They 
concede that the same problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies would 
be greater under democratic socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174). Similarly, Don Lavoie (1985a: 131) 
notes that many advocates of democratic socialism are rightly critical of rent-seeking and special-interest 
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privileges but he avers this problem “is likely to be worsened in a regime in which a single national planning 
office is given greater governmental power.”
Contrary to the claim that Hayek was ignorant of Public Choice arguments such as these, Peter Boettke 
has noted (1995: 10) that Hayek also understood the logic of “concentrated benefits, dispersed costs.” 
Furthermore, Hayek realized that this issue of special-interest lobbying and privilege is related to our previously 
discussed problem of unlimited, majoritarian democracy. Absolute democracy does not always or even 
necessarily usually result in the majority's oppressing the minority. Instead, it sometimes results in the very 
opposite, where minorities log-roll together to obtain special privileges for themselves. Hayek wrote (1984b 
[1976]: 125), “Omnipotent democracy indeed leads of necessity to a kind of socialism, but to a socialism which 
nobody foresaw or probably wanted . . . [operating on] the power of those persons or groups [in the minority] to 
extort special benefits from the government [of the majority].” Furthermore, Hayek said (1984a [1976]: 356f.),
In such a democratically elected assembly with unlimited power to confer special benefits and 
impose special burdens on particular groups, a majority can be formed only by buying the 
support of numerous special interests, through granting them such benefits at the expense of a 
minority. . . . It is the result of this bargaining process which is dignified as the 'will of the 
majority.' . . . [N]o genuine agreement among a majority exists, but for which the support of a 
majority has been obtained by deals. . . . In an omnipotent assembly which is concerned mainly 
with particulars and not with principles, majorities are therefore not based on agreement of 
opinions, but are formed by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other.
Hayek's argument poses a special challenge to the theory of deliberative democracy, according to which (Hague 
and Harrop 2007: 46f.)
we should view democracy as a method of communication. ... In an open debate arguments 
based on private interests are soon recognized and discounted; public reason involves appeal to 
the public good. ... In such conditions, a consensus should emerge about what is truly in the 
public interest, with reason triumphing over interests. 
This theory presumes that majorities are “based on agreement of opinions . . . [whereas in fact, they] are formed 
by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other” (Hayek 1984a [1976]: 357). Hague and 
Harrop (2007: 47) incisively point out that “few advocates of deliberative democracy offer specific guidance on 
institutional arrangements to secure their objective.”
However, there is an important nuance in Hayek's and Jewkes's argument which the foregoing analysis 
omits, extending beyond the logic of interest group privileges and rent-seeking. Unlike Shleifer and Vishny, 
Hayek and Jewkes do not merely argue that interest group lobbying will lead to more economic inefficiency. 
Instead, Hayek's and Jewkes's argument is more fundamental: the outcome of interest group lobbying at all is 
fundamentally at odds with the very essence and intention of socialism. Central economic planning only makes 
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sense if there is a unitary, consistent, coherent central plan. The very existence of conflicting interest groups 
which influence government, regardless of the magnitude of the inefficiency they engender, defeats the very 
purpose of socialism. 
One of the fundamental Marxist criticisms of the market had been that the market economy is an 
“anarchy of production” which must be replaced with conscious, rational direction. Socialists found it 
unconscionable that the market was being driven by price-signals which seemed to emerge from nowhere. Only 
a consciously-designed system, they thought, was deserving of rational human beings. Many socialists were 
concerned not only with inequality and poverty but also with the fact that the unplanned spontaneous order of 
the market economy seemed irrational and inscrutable. It was unjust that rational human beings had to obey 
irrational price signals. Only socialism – the conscious, central direction of the economy – would allow man to 
finally live as man and not animal, guiding his own destiny, living rationally according to his own will. The 
anarchy of production was an existential injustice which made a mockery of humankind, as Engels made clear in 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Engels 1892 [1890]: ch. 3):
But when once [the] nature [economic and productive forces are] understood, they can, in the 
hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing 
servants. . . . [We will]  subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to 
reach our own ends. . . . With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of 
commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the 
producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, definite organization. The 
struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is 
finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal 
conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which 
environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of 
man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now 
become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto 
standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be 
used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social organization, hitherto 
confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his 
own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have, hitherto, governed history,pass under 
the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, 
make his own history — only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him 
have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the 
ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
For socialists, abolishing the anarchy of production took on cosmic importance. It was not merely about 
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achieving social justice. It was about freeing mankind from an animal existence and finally letting it live as 
human beings. The abolition of capitalism meant mankind would be free to fulfill its destiny as rational beings. 
As David Ramsay Steele (1992: 39-43), this abhorrence to the anarchy of production is related to the critique of 
commodity fetishism. “For Marx, commodity fetishism is something which always arises automatically from the 
fact that the market is unplanned” (Steele 1992: 40). Steele (1992: 41) argues that for Marx, this is more 
important than material inequality:
It is this absence of control by human beings of their individual and collective destinies which is 
the true source of the pathos of Capital. Readers impressed primarily by the documented 
physical deprivation and squalor have read it superficially. Capital is a saga of the mysterious, 
macabre adventures that befall people who have lost conscious control of their collective lives.
But, Steele (1992: 43), “Marx never considers that the fetishism of commodities maybe no odder than the 
fetishism of committees.” 
Therefore, Hayek's and Jewkes's criticism cuts closer to the heart of the matter than Shleifer's and 
Vishny's. Shleifer and Vishny predict that interest group lobbying will engender economic inefficiency, but 
conceivably, a socialist could be willing to tolerate greater economic inefficiency if this maximized other, more 
important goals, such as income equality. In fact, properly understood, this would not entail economic 
inefficiency at all, because efficiency means the satisfaction of one's goals at least cost. If one's goal is income 
equality, then it may be efficient to sacrifice wealth maximization in favor of equality. In rent-seeking and the 
conferral of privileges for special interests somehow promoted equality, then this might actually be efficient. But 
according to Hayek and Jewkes, interest groups would produce not merely economic inefficiency but 
directionless and incoherent anarchy. Similarly, Lavoie (1985a: 161) says about the democratic socialists that, 
“To the extent that they insist on genuinely decentralized decision-making they are proposing the arbitrary and 
uncoordinated injection of contradictory policies by all levels and departments of government. In other words 
they have a prescription for chaos, not rational planning.” 
If Hayek and Jewkes are correct, it is not merely that socialism is inefficient, as Shleifer and Vishny 
claim. Instead, socialism utterly fails its aspiration to enable man to live according to reason. The existence of 
rent-seeking under socialism means that mankind will fail to elevate itself beyond the animal reliance on the 
forces of nature. If socialism means chaotic jockeying among interest groups with an irrational, indeterminate 
outcome, then man is still a slave to forces beyond his control. The inconvenience of economic inefficiency pales 
against the cosmic injustice of the anarchy of production which would remain unresolved under socialism.
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny rely on Mancur Olson (1965) and Gary Becker (1983) for their model of 
regulation, Hayek's and Jewkes's theory of incoherence and instability of decision-making under democratic 
socialism appears to be an example of the general problem of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke and 
Leeson 2002, Boettke 1995: 19). Arrow showed that it is impossible to aggregate a multitude of individually 
12
ordinal and transitive preference functions into one single ordinal-transitive social preference function. The only 
means by which the political preference function can satisfy all of Arrow's conditions is through dictatorship 
(Butler 2012: 32; Stevens 1993: 47, 143-145; Hinich and Munger 1997: 95-99). Arrow showed mathematically 
that any possible voting rule whatsoever will be susceptible to one of several paradoxes. The problem is that 
given individually transitive and ordinal preferences, there is no mathematically-guaranteed way to aggregate 
them together into one social preference function that is free of paradoxes. The only way to avoid the paradoxes, 
according to Arrow, is through dictatorship since this avoids the need to aggregate individual preference 
functions into one social preference function. The wider the scope of government, and the more authority 
democratic institutions are entrusted with, the more likely an Arrow paradox is to occur. The wider the scope of 
government, the more likely one will have to resort to dictatorship to guarantee rational governance.
The Arrow theorem poses a grave dilemma for democratic socialism. What socialism fundamentally 
aims to accomplish is the transformation of society from what Michael Oakeshott (1975) called a “civil 
association” of shared means – such as private property and the rule-of-law – intended to enable all its members 
to pursue their own happiness as they individually define it for themselves, into an “enterprise association” of a 
single set of shared ends common to all members of society. It is doubtful whether this goal is morally desirable 
or whether it is compatible with individual freedom, for the rule-of-law as Hayek understood it can exist only in 
what Oakeshott called a civic association (Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). But even if – for the sake of argument 
– we assume that this transformation of society into an enterprise association is compatible with liberty and 
individual rights, the fact is that the Arrow paradox means that it is impossible for democratic institutions to 
successfully accomplish this transformation. Democratic institutions, subject to the Arrow paradox, are unable to 
translate diverse individual ends into a single set of shared ends. This is not so damaging for capitalistic or 
market-based institutions, because these have the more modest purpose of maintaining society as a mere civic 
association. Since the goal of such institutions is not to unite society behind one single set of ends, their 
effectiveness is not undermined as much by the Arrow paradox. But because democratic socialism intends to 
unite society behind some single set of shared ends and to transform society into an enterprise association, the 
Arrow paradox is particularly fatal to democratic socialism. Only dictatorship is consistently capable of 
accomplishing socialism's call to transform society from a civic to an enterprise association.
Similarly, Hayek and Jewkes do not merely say that pressure groups will create economic inefficiencies. 
Their criticism is more fundamental: the unitary, coherent, consistent plan demanded by socialism simply cannot 
be obtained under democracy. Democratic socialism cannot work because there is no way to deduce societal 
preferences or the one and only “general will.” Just as Mises showed that socialism cannot economically 
calculate the optimal production decisions, likewise, Hayek, Jewkes, and Arrow showed that neither can 
socialism “calculate” the will of the people or the optimal political policy without resorting to dictatorship. If we 
interpret Hayek's argument as a form of the Arrow theorem, then we can understand his claim that the chaos and 
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incoherency of democratic economic planning will tend to conclude with the people demanding the appointment 
of a dictator who can bypass the legislature and finally “get things done.” 
The point here is not that democratic socialism must necessarily be dictatorial, but rather that it must be 
dictatorial in order to produce a unitary socialist economic plan. Contrariwise, democratic socialism may eschew 
dictatorship but in doing so, it creates the possibility that the central economic plan will be incoherent and 
random. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that one may eliminate paradoxes only at the cost of dictatorship 
and that one may avoid dictatorship only at the cost of suffering democratic paradoxes. This undermines the 
“naive view of democratic governance [which] dominated discourse” at the time of Hayek and Jewkes and 
refutes the notion that “[t]he voting process unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 
15).
Shleifer and Vishny's (1994) claim that rent-seeking inefficiencies will be endemic to market socialism is 
not as fatal to democratic socialism as Hayek's (2007 [1944]) and Jewkes's (1968 [1948]) argument. A socialist 
could reply to Shleifer and Vishny that they are willing to tolerate a reduction in productivity and GDP if it 
means greater equality or if this allows mankind to take its destiny into its own hands. But Hayek and Jewkes 
argued that rent-seeking under democratic socialism would not merely lead to inefficiency, but chaos and 
absurdity. It is not merely that GDP will suffer a diminution. Instead, it is impossible to form a coherent, unitary 
economic plan under democracy. This fact is fatal to democratic socialism. Democratic political institutions and 
socialist economics are fundamentally incompatible.
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1 Wilhelm Röpke as well made arguments similar to those of Hayek and Jewkes: see Röpke (1987 [1951]: 24-
35, 1992 [1942]: 83-99, 1998 [1957]: 90-150). However, Röpke's arguments in this area were exceedingly 
brief, and what he did say on our subject, Hayek and Jewkes said in much more detail. Therefore, this essay 
will confine itself to reexamining Hayek and Jewkes. Nevertheless, the interested reader should examine 
Röpke's statements for him- or herself.
2 I could not find any academic citations of Jewkes except for antiquated book reviews. Positive reviews of 
Jewkes include those by Grampp (1949), Levitan (1949), Mackintosh (1949), and Worcester (1978). Mixed 
reviews include Brown (1948), Harris (1949), and Lipson (1949). Negative reviews include Fischer (1949), 
Brewin (1950), Aldcraft (1968), Sutherland (1968), and Lewis (1969). One important criticism made by 
several reviewers – both positive and negative – is that Jewkes failed to realize that his defense of the price-
system and Say's Law was inconsistent with his simultaneous endorsement of Keynesian macroeconomic 
management.
3 Cf. Lavoie's (1985a: 131) statement that while advocates of democratic socialism are right to criticize rent-
seeking, their solution to this problem – viz. expanding the government's power over the economy – would 
make the problem worse. A better solution, Lavoie says, is to limit government's ability to bestow privilege 
on anybody and to reduce the number of benefits it has to offer anyone. 
4 For an interesting fictional illustration of how political incentives undermine market socialism, see Spufford 
(2010: 283-299, esp. 292). For a review of Spufford's novel, showing how much historical detail it reliably 
embodies despite its fictional nature, see Henderson (2012-2013).
5 Hayek (1948: 197-199) replied that it would be impossible to deny political officials discretion in the way 
Lange specified, because costs are not as objective as Lange thought, and so higher-level officials would have 
to constantly second-guess the subjective cost accounts of their inferiors. In a different way, Shleifer and 
Vishny [1994] argue that Lange failed to specify what incentive these officials have to faithfully obey Lange's 
system, and so Public Choice government failures will be endemic in the attempted implementation of 
Lange's market socialism. Schweickart (1992: 28) specifies that under economic democracy, there must be 
“socialist entrepreneurs” who innovate, take risks and speculate, making his system remarkably subject to the 
respective criticisms of Hayek and Shleifer-Vishny. But when a social entrepreneur's risky innovation turns 
out to have been mistaken, how will the socialist system be able to determine whether this was a responsible 
risk which was worth taking despite its eventual failure – because the failure could not have been foreseen – 
or whether this was an irresponsible risk whose failure the socialist entrepreneur should have foreseen? As 
Hayek said to Lange, the socialist government must somehow second-guess the socialist entrepreneur's every 
decision.
6 That Austrian market process theory is compatible with Public Choice political process theory, see Boettke 
and López (2002) and Ikeda (2003). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me to these papers.
7 Ludwig von Mises (1981 [1922]: 203f.) also noticed the connection between socialism's attack on 
competition and its unintentional rehabilitation of interest group politics: “In exposing the effects of 
protection, Liberalism broke the aggressive power of particular interests. . . . In order to rehabilitate 
protection, it was necessary to destroy Liberalism. . . . Once Liberalism has been completely vanquished, 
however, and no longer menaces the protective system, there remains nothing to oppose the extension of 
particular privileges.”
8 For a discussion of Hayek's thesis of the inseparability of political and economic freedom, see Makovi 
(2016b).
9 That regulation constitutes de facto nationalization, see Mises (1981 [1922]: 45). That such was done by the 
Nazi regime, see Mises (1974 [1950]: 24f.).
10 Farrant and McPhail (2009: 12, 15) disagree with Caldwell. For a defense of Caldwell against Farant and 
McPhail, see Makovi (2016b). (I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Farrant and McPhail [2009]).
11 One may examine the measures of economic freedom compiled by the Fraser Institute under its Economic 
Freedom of the World index and come to the same conclusion. For any given year, Sweden has – compared to 
its contemporaries – tended to have low levels of regulation, low trade-barriers, and high degrees of 
protection of private-property, tempered by high levels of taxation and redistribution. This is completely 
unlike the sort of regulatory command-and-control and nationalization to which Hayek's thesis in the Road to  
Serfdom applies.
12 I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Lawson and Clark (2010).
13 I thank Willem J. A. van der Deijl for forcing me to clarify this point.
14 This may buttress Buchanan's and Tullock's argument for qualified majority parliamentary voting in Calculus  
of Consent (1962). If Hayek is right that government ought to act only where there is agreement, this might 
imply that all legislation should command the support of a super-majority. For reviews of Buchanan's and 
Tullock's argument, cf. Butler (2012: 95-100), Stevens (1993: 134-139), and Hinich and Munger (1997: 100-
103).
15 Shleifer and Vishny cite Olson (1965) and Becker (1983). I would add Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Butler 
(2012: 36f.), and Stevens (1993: 214-229).
